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After a very long gestation the Mental Capacity Bill1 (the Bill) was published earlier this year.
Among its proposals was the incorporation into statute of advance decisions. These are devices
whereby a person, while retaining capacity, can make certain decisions regarding their future
treatment for such a time as they have lost capacity and so are unable to make legally binding
decisions about their own treatment. As the Bill is phrased, advance decisions (ADs) only permit
a person to refuse treatment. There is no provision for that person to use ADs to express a positive
preference for particular forms of treatment. It will be argued this represents a missed opportunity
to allow patients and clinicians to engage in a more constructive approach to treatment planning.
Experience from the USA demonstrates psychiatric advance directives (PADs) have a role to play
in engaging psychiatric patients and promoting adherence to their treatment plans.
This paper will only address the use of AD in relation to mental health treatment, although it is
recognised they have an application far wider than this, including decisions regarding life-sustaining
treatment.
Background to the Mental Capacity Bill
The process of delivering a statute codifying the law relating to the assessment and treatment of
people lacking capacity dates back to 1989, when the Law Commission embarked on ‘an
investigation into the adequacy of the legal and other procedures for the making of decisions on behalf of
mentally incapacitated adults’2. This programme had been initiated following a Law Society
discussion document3 and then the judgment in Re F,4 which highlighted the lacuna in English law
that ‘no procedure [exists] whereby any other person or court can take a medical decision on behalf of an
adult patient without capacity to take that decision’.5
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1 Department of Constitutional Affairs (2004) Mental
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In the interim there have also been two significant cases focussing on the question of refusal of
treatment for physical conditions. Re T6 involved a young woman, Miss T, who was 34 weeks
pregnant when she was involved in a car accident. She was admitted to hospital and some time later
went into labour, which led to an emergency Caesarian section. Thereafter, Miss T’s condition
deteriorated and she was admitted to the intensive care unit. The consultant anaesthetist would
normally have given Miss T a blood transfusion but, on this occasion, was reluctant to do so
because Miss T had twice told clinical staff she did not want a blood transfusion. Both instances
had occurred shortly after Miss T had had a private conversation with her mother, who was a
Jehovah’s Witness. Although Miss T had been brought up by her mother after her parents
separated, she was not an adherent to that faith and it was contended Miss T had made her
pronouncements under the influence of her mother. Miss T’s father applied to the court for a
declaration as to whether it would be lawful to give her the blood transfusion that was thought
necessary to save her life.
The court of first instance authorised the blood transfusion and held Miss T had neither
consented nor refused the transfusion in the emergency that had arisen. To proceed with the
transfusion was seen to be acting in her best interests. The case went to the Court of Appeal after
Miss T appealed but the importance of providing ‘guidance to hospital authorities and to the medical
profession on the appropriate response to a refusal by an adult to accept treatment’7 was also recognised.
In his leading judgment, Lord Donaldson, MR, held that
‘Prima facie every adult has the right and capacity to decide whether or not he will accept medical
treatment, even if a refusal may risk permanent injury to his health or even lead to premature death.
Furthermore, it matters not whether the reasons for the refusal were rational or irrational, unknown or
even non-existent. ...... However, the presumption of capacity to decide, which stems from the fact that
the patient is an adult, is rebuttable.’8
He also emphasised that ‘an adult patient who ... suffers from no mental incapacity has an absolute right
to choose whether to consent to medical treatment, to refuse it or to choose one rather than another of the
treatments being offered’.9 Re T was concerned with refusal of the medical treatment proposed but
this did not exclude the possibility of any patient giving consent to the future administration of
treatment in particular circumstances.
The case of Re C10 involved a man suffering from chronic paranoid schizophrenia who developed
gangrene in his right foot. His surgeon advised amputation of the lower leg as he considered death
was imminent without such radical surgery. C refused to consent to such a procedure but did agree
to more conservative treatment. Faced with the possibility of a recurrence of the gangrene, 
C sought an undertaking, in vain, that the hospital would not amputate his leg in any future
circumstances. C then approached the High Court seeking an injunction to prevent the hospital
operating at that time or in the future without his consent. Judgment from Thorpe, J. confirmed a
capacitous patient’s entitlement not only to refuse the proposed treatment but also his right to
have such a refusal respected in the future even if he should become incapacitated in the meantime.
6 Re T (adult: refusal of medical treatment) [1992] 4
All ER 649.
7 Ibid, per Lord Donaldson, MR, at 660.
8 Ibid, at 664. See also Sidaway v Board of Governors
of the Bethlem Royal Hospital [1985] 1 All ER 643,
per Lord Templeman at 666.
9 Ibid, at 652–3.
10 Re C (Refusal of medical treatment) [1994] 1 All ER
819.
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The Law Commission’s final report11 in 1995 considered ‘Advance Statements about Health care’12
and distinguished between ‘an advance expression of views and preferences .... and an advance
decision..’.13 It pointed out many model advance directives take the form of anticipatory consent to
types of treatment in relation to physical conditions.14 Indeed, surgery under general anaesthesia,
except in an emergency situation, requires an anticipatory decision to consent to the proposed
procedure.15 The Law Commission also made the point that case law in this area will focus on
advance decisions to refuse particular forms of treatment, since if the person has already
consented, prior to losing capacity, to the type of treatment the treating physician later wishes to
administer, there will be no dispute and the treatment will be given. However, this presupposes
there is no conflict between the treatment specified by the patient and the treatment considered
appropriate by the physician. For example, both patient and psychiatrist may agree on the
desirability of restarting antipsychotic medication but while the former is only willing to consider
oral medication the latter may believe the long acting preparations given by depot injections are
necessary. 
Advance consent is considered in three paragraphs with the remaining 25 being concerned with
advance refusals of treatment. The Commission’s Report does argue that ‘to maintain the effect of
the present law (by incorporating the judgments of Re C and Re T into statute) is consistent with our
policy aim of enabling people to make such decisions as they are able to make for themselves’.16
This appears to sidestep the issue of advance consent although does not exclude it. Patients with
capacity are able to make decisions to give consent as well as to refuse treatment options. 
The common law, however, would recognise the latter but not the former as an advance decision.
Advance Statements in England and Wales
The General Medical Council (GMC) acknowledges capacitous adult patients ‘can express their
wishes about future treatment in an advance statement’ but notes only a valid advance refusal of
treatment is legally binding.17 It makes no distinction between treatment for physical and mental
disorders.
The British Medical Association (BMA) has drawn up a Code of Practice on advance statements.18
It recognises that accommodating a patient’s views, values and attitudes about his treatment is both
fundamental to good practice but also a curb on clinical decision-making. Advance statements can
take many forms, varying from a general description of a person’s preferences and belief systems
to a clear instruction not to provide certain treatments (advance directive). However, any advance
statement is limited by existing statute and so could be overridden by the provisions permitting
11 Ibid. This report had been preceded by four
consultation papers published in 1989 (1) and 1993
(3).
12 Op cit Note 5. Law Commission 1995, Part V.
13 Ibid; at para 5.1. This is later expanded on (at para
5.10) and the difference between ‘anticipatory
decisions’ and mere statements of wishes made in
advance of the person’s loss of capacity is emphasised.
14 Ibid; at para 5.11.
15 Francis, R. and Johnston, C. Medical Treatment:
Decisions and the Law. (2001). Butterworths: London;
at p22.
Technically all consents or refusals are given in
advance of the proposed treatments, albeit the period
between consent and providing the treatment is almost
always very short. ‘Treatment without consent or
despite a refusal of consent will constitute the civil
wrong of trespass to the person and may constitute a
crime’ – Lord Donaldson in Re T at 653.
16 Op cit Note 5; at para 5.16.
17 General Medical Council (2002) Withholding and
withdrawing life-prolonging treatments: Good practice
in decision-making. London: GMC.
18 British Medical Association (1995) Advance
Statements about medical treatment – Code of
Practice. London: BMA.
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compulsory treatment for mental disorder under the Mental Health Act 1983. Such statements
also cannot direct a clinician to act in a manner that is harmful, illegal, inappropriate to accepted
clinical practice or contrary to their conscience. 
In psychiatry, clinical guidelines for the treatment of schizophrenia, commissioned by the National
Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE), have advocated ‘advance directives about the choice of
medication’ should be filed in patients’ records.19 This would permit positive choices as well as
refusal of particular medication to be documented. The report’s actual recommendations
withdraw from this absolute position, recognising ‘there are limitations with advance directives
regarding the choice of treatment for individuals with schizophrenia’ but encouraging they are
developed as part of the care programme.20 The nature of those limitations is not spelt out in the
report.
Judging by the published research there is little practical experience of the use of advance
statements or directives in psychiatry. One group, at the Maudsley Hospital, London, encouraged
the use of ‘crisis cards’ among known psychiatric patients.21 ‘Crisis cards’ record, among other
details, a patient’s current treatment and ‘preferences in anticipation of a later occasion when the
patient might be too ill to express them directly’. The cards were drawn up in discussion with the
patient’s clinical team so as to produce an agreed plan of action to manage the next crisis for the
patient. 65% of patients stated certain treatment preferences and 53% made advance refusals of
specific medication. At follow up one year later the rate of hospital admission for this group of
patients had been reduced by 30% and the researchers also commented on the psychological
benefits to the patients accruing from working collaboratively with the psychiatric services.
However, another research team, also in London, found that patients who had completed an
‘advance directive’ did not have a lower readmission rate compared to patients without such a
document.22 As Geller has pointed out, these were not ‘directives’ but rather ‘preference statements’
and this may account for the lack of a demonstrable reduction in readmission rates.23 While more
research is required to isolate the ‘active ingredient(s)’ in such documents, Geller’s comments
highlight a problem: the literature is replete with examples of loose terminology in this area.
Advance statements may be decisions, or directives or simply a record of certain preferences by
the patient. As such they contain differing blends of collaboration, directive force and import.
The interpretation of ADs may also be problematic. In one study health professionals, presented
with a hypothetical vignette concerning a patient with dementia, came to very different
conclusions as to how to proceed.24 Those who chose to override the AD seemed to be prepared
to make subjective interpretations on quality of life issues when to uphold the AD was regarded
as not being in the patient’s best clinical interests. The authors cautioned that anyone completing
19 National Collaborating Centre for Mental Health
(2003) Schizophrenia: Full national clinical guidelines
on core interventions in primary and secondary care.
London: Gaskell and the British Psychological Society.
At para 7.10.3.
20 Ibid; at para 7.10.4.
21 Sutherby, K., Szmukler, G.I., Halpern, A. et al (1999)
A study of ‘crisis cards’ in a community psychiatric
service. Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica 100, 56–61.
22 Papageorgiou, A., King, M., Janmohamed, A. et al
(2002) Advance directives for patients compulsorily
admitted to hospital with serious mental illness. British
Journal of Psychiatry, 181, 513–519.
23 Geller, G.L. (2003) Advance directives about
treatment preferences had little impact on compulsory
readmissions for people with serious mental illness.
Evidence-Based Mental Health, 6, 88.
24 Thompson, T., Barbour, R. and Schwartz, L. (2003)
Adherence to advance directives in critical care
decision making: vignette study. British Medical
Journal, 327, 1011–1014. 
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an AD cannot be assured of a particular outcome in a particular situation. Another commentator
advised when an AD appeared to advocate a course of action that would be detrimental to the
patient, its validity should be carefully scrutinised to ensure it was applicable to the situation under
discussion.25
A patient has no enforceable right to demand a particular type of treatment. However, is advance
consent for a particular drug a demand for that drug and no other; or is it consent to take that drug
should it be prescribed by the doctor who has, in the exercise of professional judgment, decided
it is the most appropriate treatment? In one respect at least, psychiatric patients have an advantage
over other people drawing up advance statements with regard to, for example, end of life decisions.
Having had a previous episode of illness they have their own experiences to draw on and these can
inform their subsequent decisions as to what treatment strategies, including medication, were
helpful and which were not. Intuitively, advance treatment plans are likely to be most successful if
they have been constructed in a collaborative fashion, rather than either party taking up unrealistic
or dogmatic positions.
Psychiatric Advance Directives in the USA
Szasz is credited with first proposing what he termed a ‘psychiatric will’26 but psychiatric advance
directives became more prominent with the passage of the Patient Self-Determination Act in 1991.
This Act required hospitals receiving federal funding to inform all admitted patients of their right
to formulate an advance directive. As elsewhere, in the United States of America advance directives
can be divided into instructional directives, which record the person’s decisions regarding
treatment in anticipation of the time when they do not have the capacity to take such decisions,
and proxy directives, which may also be combined with specific directions regarding treatment.
These appoint another person who is empowered to take health care decisions whenever the
individual is lacking capacity.
All American states now have advance directive statutes, covering healthcare generally, and 
14 states have explicit laws addressing psychiatric advance directives.27 An example is North
Carolina’s Advance Instructions for Mental Health Treatment.28 The advance directive can be used to
consent to or refuse specific psychiatric treatment.29 Although the person can specify his options
for mental health treatment these can be set aside if the instructions are not consistent with
established standards of appropriate practice or with the availability of the treatment requested.
This has raised concerns that non-clinical factors may determine whether an advance instruction is
honoured or not.30 In addition an individual can appoint a proxy decision-maker to act on his
behalf when he is incapable of making a decision, through the Health Care Power of Attorney Act.
25 Treloar, AJ. (1999) Advance Directives: Limitations
upon their applicability in elderly care. International
Journal of Geriatric Psychiatry, 14, 1039–1043.
26 Szasz, T.S. (1982) The psychiatric will: A new
mechanism for protecting persons against ‘psychosis’
and psychiatry. American Psychologist, 37, 762–770.
See also: Appelbaum, P.S. (1991) Advance directives
for mental health treatment. Hospital and Community
Psychiatry, 42, 983–4.
27 Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law. Analysis of
state laws. In: Power in Planning: Self-determination
through psychiatric advance directives. 
www.bazelon.org/issues/advancedirectives/publications/powe
rinplanning/index.htm Accessed 4 June 2004.
28 North Carolina General Statute. Chapter 122C-71, et
seq. This was modelled on Oregon’s statute and was
later amended by the passage of the Health Care
Power of Attorney Act (1998).
29 Overview of PADs in the US at present. Accessed on
1 June 2004 from:
http://pad.duhs.duke.edu/background.html 
30 Op cit Note 27.
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The appointee is obligated to act in accordance with the individual’s previously stated decisions.
In Washington D.C. the Health Care Decisions Act of 198831 made provision for a person’s
treatment preferences to be included in a durable power of attorney for health care, which would
be followed by the appointee or any other substitute decision-maker. In 2001 the Mental Health
Consumers’ Rights Protection Act32 emphasised the importance of a psychiatric advance directive.
Medication could only be administered with the consent of the patient. If incapacitated then the
patient’s proxy decision-maker was bound by the treatment decisions contained within the
patient’s advance directive or durable power of attorney.
Psychiatric advance directives are regarded as potentially powerful, non-coercive instruments that
make the clients the ‘active agents’ and so enhance their ‘sense of autonomy, control and dignity’.33
By engaging the person in the process of deliberating on their illness history and the factors,
including medication, that had been effective during previous psychiatric episodes it is believed
advance directives could improve the therapeutic alliance between clinicians and patient and may
improve the person’s treatment adherence34 with its consequent benefits in terms of quality of life
and reduced need for hospitalisation. Through such a process a PAD could be beneficial even if
the person does not lose their capacity for decision-making and the document is never formally
enacted. Perhaps not surprisingly, patients have been more enthusiastic about PADs than clinicians,
who tend to have concerns over their clinical autonomy and legal liability in following or not
following the person’s advance instructions.35
There is also a perceived risk that PADs could increase the use of commitment orders permitting
psychiatrists to bypass the patients’ advance instructions36 or, alternatively, if drafted with too
many caveats may be frequently ignored and leave patients feeling further marginalized in their
own treatment decisions.37 However, used sensitively, they have been advocated as ‘a means of
reconciling (patient) autonomy and the initiation of non-consensual treatment at an early stage of relapse’,
which could avert the need for rehospitalisation and, in the future, the need for more coercive
community treatment orders.38
31 D.C. Code Ann. ss21–2201 et seq. 1998.
32 Title II, section 101, et seq.
33 Swanson, J.W., Tepper, M.C., Backlar, P. and Swartz,
M.S. (2000) Psychiatric Advance Directives: An
alternative to coercive treatment? Psychiatry, 63,
160–172.
34 American research has demonstrated active engagement
with the patient during decision-making enhances
treatment compliance even when the outcome is
contrary to the patient’s original wishes. See Monahan
et al (1996) Coercion to in-patient treatment: initial
results and implications for assertive treatment in the
community. In: Coercion and aggressive community
treatment: A new frontier in mental health law. Editors
D. Dennis and J. Monahan. Kluwer Academic
Publishers.
35 Swanson, J.W., Swartz, M.S., Hannon, M.J. et al
(2003) Psychiatric Advance Directives: A survey of
persons with schizophrenia, family members, and
treatment providers. International Journal of Forensic
Mental Health, 2, 73–86.
36 Ibid.
37 Op cit Note 33.
38 Halpern, A. and Szmukler, G. (1997) Psychiatric
advance directives: reconciling autonomy and non-
consensual treatment. Psychiatric Bulletin, 21,
323–327.
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The Mental Capacity Bill for England and Wales39
The Mental Capacity Bill40 (the Bill) was presented to Parliament in June 2004. A draft Mental
Incapacity Bill41, published the previous year, had been subjected to pre-legislative scrutiny by a
Joint Committee from the two Houses of Parliament.42 A number of recommendations were made
and responded to by the Government.43
The Bill applies to people over the age of 16 years, who lack decision-making capacity. It is not
concerned with the compulsory detention or treatment of patients suffering from mental
disorder44 but its provisions will replace Part VII Mental Health Act (MHA),45 as well as the
Enduring Powers of Attorney Act 1985.46 The Bill’s purpose is ‘to clarify a number of legal
uncertainties and reform and update the current law where decisions need to be made on behalf of others.
The Bill .... covers a wide range of decisions, on personal welfare as well as financial matters and substitute
decision-making .... and clarifies the position where no such formal process has been adopted.’47
The Expert Committee reviewing reform of the MHA48 placed importance, in its General
Principles, on ‘respect for patient autonomy [which] implies respect for the treatment choices of those who
have the capacity necessary to make them. Patient autonomy therefore brings with it an inevitable emphasis
on capacity’.49 The Mental Capacity Bill includes, as its first principle, a presumption in favour of
capacity; adding that a person cannot be said to lack capacity for a particular decision ‘unless all
practicable steps to help him’ have been tried or, conversely, simply because he makes ‘an unwise
decision’.50
Clause 2 of the Bill defines a person lacking capacity as one who is unable to make a decision
‘because of an impairment of, or a disturbance [whether permanent or temporary] in the functioning of,
the mind or brain’.51 It is a functional test which is both specific in time and to the type of decision
to be made. Clause 3 then defines the four bases on which a person may be unable to make a
decision: being unable to understand, retain or use the relevant information in making a decision,
or unable to communicate the decision using any means. The test thus codifies the threshold of
capacity articulated in Re C.52
39 Scotland passed its Adults with Incapacity (Scotland)
Act in 2000. This statute does not provide for advance
directives although proxy decision-making does permit
cognisance to be taken of the patient’s past and present
wishes.
40 Op cit Note 1.
41 Department of Constitutional Affairs (2003) Draft
Mental Incapacity Bill. Cm 5859. London: The
Stationery Office.
42 House of Lords, House of Commons Joint Committee on
the Draft Mental Incapacity Bill (2003) Draft Mental
Incapacity Bill. Session 2002–03. Volume I. HL Paper
189-1, HC 1083-1. London: The Stationery Office.
Accessed on 20 January 2004, at:
www.parliament.uk/parliamentary_committees/jcmib.cfm
43 The Government Response to The Scrutiny Committee’s
Report on the draft Mental Incapacity Bill. February
2004. Accessed from the Department of Constitutional
Affairs website on 20 April 2004.
(www.dca.gov.uk/pubs/reports/mental-incapacity.htm)
44 Op cit Note 1; Explanatory Notes para 86.
45 Dealing with the ‘Management of Property and
Affairs of Patients’.
46 Op cit Note 1; Explanatory Notes para 5.
47 Op cit Note 1; Explanatory Notes para 4.
48 Expert Committee (1999) Review of the Mental
Health Act 1983 (Chair: Professor G. Richardson).
London: Department of Health.
49 Ibid; at para 2.4.
50 Op cit Note 1; Clause 1.
51 Op cit Note 1; Clause 2(1).
52 Op cit Note 10.
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Outline of the new Statutory Scheme for Decision-Making
The concept of ‘best interests’ provides the overriding consideration for decisions taken on behalf
of incapacitated people and it appears throughout the proposed statutory scheme. Even for people
lacking capacity the Bill encourages their participation ‘as fully as possible in any act done for him and
any decision affecting him’.53 Best interests is broader than just focussed on medical interests but
includes the person’s ‘past and present wishes and feelings ... and the other factors ... he would be likely
to consider if he were able to do so’. Additionally, views on the same issues should be sought, if
‘practicable and appropriate’ from any person nominated by the person, any carer or those ‘interested
in his welfare’, donee of a lasting power of attorney and any court appointed deputy (see below).54
However, none of the views is binding but need only be ‘take(n) into account’.55 Indeed, it may not
be appropriate to involve a donee or deputy if their role is related to decision-making in a different
sphere of the person’s life. 
(i) Acts in connection with care or treatment
This provision provides ‘statutory protection against liability for certain acts done in connection with the
care and treatment of another person’.56 Previously the power of ‘General Authority’ in the draft
Mental Incapacity Bill,57 this provision relates to everyday decisions taken by a carer on behalf of
an incapacitated person but hitherto on an informal, and potentially unlawful, basis. It aims ‘to
clarify aspects of the common law principle of necessity as it applies to key actions done for people who lack
capacity.’58 Its informality persists as the power will be assumed by, rather than given to, the
provider of care. Its assumption is based on a reasonableness test: that the carer ‘reasonably believes’
the person lacks capacity and the act is in the person’s best interests’.59 It will exist for the duration
of the task under consideration. The Joint Committee recommended recognition of a concept of
‘general incapacity’ for people with on-going incapacity, which would avoid the necessity of a series
of repeated decision specific assessments of capacity.60 This was not accepted in the Government’s
Response and has also failed to appear in the Bill. The Bill places certain limitations on the exercise
of this provision61 but as the Government’s Response made clear it is not expected to be limited
entirely to everyday, routine matters.62
(ii) Lasting Power of Attorney
A capacitous person (donor) may elect to confer on another person (donee) the authority to make
decisions in the spheres of personal welfare and/or property and affairs when the donor no longer
has capacity63 (otherwise known as lasting power of attorney: LPA).64 The authority has to be
conferred via an instrument, which may contain conditions or restrictions, and is subject to the
overriding principle of being in the donor’s best interests.65 In the sphere of personal welfare, the
scope of LPA extends to health care decisions, namely, the ‘giving or refusing consent to the carrying
53 Op cit Note 1, Clause 4(4).
54 Op cit Note 1, Clause 4(6).
55 Ibid.
56 Op cit Note 1, Explanatory Notes para 30.
57 Op cit Note 41; Clause 6.
58 Op cit Note 1; Explanatory Notes; at para 30.
59 Op cit Note 1; Clause 5(1).
60 Op cit Note 42; at para 68.
61 Op cit Note 1; Clause 6.
62 Op cit Note 43; Response to Recommendation 36.
63 Op cit Note 1; clause 9(1).
64 Under existing provisions in the Enduring Powers of
Attorney Act 1985 (which would be repealed by the
Bill on becoming law) the appointed donee has no
authority to act for the donor in matters of healthcare.
65 Op cit Note 1; Clause 9(4).
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out or continuation of a treatment’66 but does not extend to giving or refusing consent to life-
sustaining treatment unless the donor has expressly stated that is his intention before he loses
capacity.67 Depending on the degree of thoroughness and specificity in the instrument, the
authority of LPA may be restricted to enacting previously made decisions on behalf of the
incapacitated person or it may take the form of substituted decision making. 
(iii) Court of Protection and its deputies.
The Bill will create a new Court of Protection68 with extended jurisdiction ‘(1) to make substitute
decisions about personal welfare or property and affairs for persons lacking capacity, or (2) to appoint a
deputy to do so.’69 The Court will also have the authority to make declarations.70
In the realm of welfare matters the court appointed deputy will be permitted to decide on health
care issues including ‘giving or refusing consent to the carrying out or continuation of a treatment’.71
In the draft Bill, deputies also had the authority to give consent to the withdrawal of life-sustaining
treatment. The Joint Committee ‘strongly urged’ the Government to exclude such a provision when
the Bill was redrafted and reserve such decisions to the Court of Protection itself.72
The Government declined to take up this recommendation, believing it was not necessary to have
‘a blanket exclusion of a power to refuse treatment’.73 However, the Bill now requires the Court of
Protection to give ‘express authority’ to the deputy to refuse consent for life sustaining treatment.74
Advance Decisions in the Mental Capacity Bill
The Minister of State for the Government Department responsible for the Bill, the Department of
Constitutional Affairs, has declared that ‘advance decisions are just one aspect of a Bill that will
empower vulnerable people to make as many decisions for themselves as possible’; adding that ‘positive
requests for treatment will need to be taken account of when making a decision on behalf of a person
lacking capacity’.75
Clause 23 of the Bill defines an ‘advance decision’ as 
‘a decision made by a person, after he has reached 18 and when he has capacity to do so, that if – 
(a) at a later time and in such circumstances as he may specify, a specified treatment is proposed to be
carried out or continued by a person providing health care for him, and
(b) at that time he lacks capacity to consent to the carrying out or continuation of the treatment, 
the specified treatment is not to be carried out or continued.’76
Thus the Bill permits anticipated decision making by the person concerned since it is made while
the person retains capacity but only becomes operative after capacity has been lost and when the
66 Op cit Note 1; Clause 11(6).
67 Op cit Note 1; Clause 11(7)(a).
68 Described in Part 2 of the Bill: ‘The Court of
Protection and the Public Guardian’.
69 Op cit Note 1; Explanatory Notes, para 58.
70 Op cit Note 1; Clause 15. The Court may make
declarations as to whether a person has capacity for a
particular decision or whether ‘an act or proposed act was
or would be lawful’. In its exercise of the latter power the
Court would function as a superior court of record with a
range of powers and authority similar to the High Court
(see Explanatory Notes to the Bill, para 57).
71 Op cit Note 1; Clause 17(1)(d).
72 Op cit Note 42; para 184.
73 Op cit Note 43; Response to Recommendation 54.
74 Op cit Note 1; Clause 20(5).
75 Lord Filkin: Department of Constitutional Affairs
Press Release 180/04, 22 April 2004.
76 Clause 24 (1).
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treatment specified is being contemplated. While the person retains capacity the AD may be
amended or withdrawn at any time.77 The AD will become invalid if the person does ‘anything else
clearly inconsistent with the advance decision remaining his fixed decision’.78 It will also not apply if the
proposed treatment is not included in the AD, the circumstances described are absent, or novel
circumstances exist which the person did not foresee but had they been anticipated ‘would have
affected his decision’.79 The last point calls for an element of ‘substituted judgment’ on the part of the
health professional, in deciding whether to make the AD inapplicable but the wording sets the
higher threshold of ‘would’ rather than ‘may have’ affected the decision. An AD can also be
overridden when the person subsequently makes a lasting power of attorney that specifically
relates to the treatment detailed in the AD.80 Furthermore the effect of an AD can be suspended
pending a declaration by the Court of Protection as to whether or not it is applicable to the
proposed treatment.81
Advance decisions ‘give statutory confirmation to existing court rulings82 that a treating doctor is obliged
to respect a lawfully-made advance decision about a specified treatment’.83 Many of the submissions to
the Joint Committee scrutinising the draft Bill were concerned with the withdrawal of life-
sustaining treatment and ADs. The Committee rejected the argument this would bring euthanasia
a step closer; instead regarding an AD as ‘appropriate continuation of respect for a patient’s individual
autonomy’.84 Among the Committee’s recommendations the importance of having access to
professional advice when preparing an advance decision was mentioned, as was the need for
guidance in the Code of Practice as to what constituted a valid and applicable AD. The
Government signalled its willingness to work with health professionals and patient groups in
formulating the Codes of Practice85 and ADs are specifically included in the Codes required of the
Lord Chancellor by the Bill.86
Advance Decisions and Mental Health Treatment
The Bill has an ‘enabling’ philosophy87 and is constructed around the concept of capacity whereas
the Mental Health Act 1983 is concerned with compulsion, which is not reliant on the lack of
capacity. Views have been expressed that the next Mental Health Act should be based around
capacity88 or, indeed, that there would be little need for one if a Mental Incapacity Act was
comprehensive.89
77 Clause 24 (3).
78 Clause 25(2)(c). 
79 Clause 25(4)(c).
80 Clause 25(2)(b).
81 Clause 26 (4). While the declaration is awaited,
interventions to prevent the death of the person or to
prevent a serious deterioration in the person’s condition
are permitted.
82 Op cit Notes 6 (Re T) & 10 (re C).
83 Op cit Note 42; para 194.
84 Op cit Note 42; para 199.
85 Op cit Note 43; Response to Recommendation 61.
86 Op cit Note 1; Clause 40(1)(e).
87 Op cit Note 42; para 29.
88 Op cit Note 48: The Expert Committee reviewing the
MHA put the principle of patient autonomy and the
‘notion of capacity which flows from it’ as one of its
Guiding Principles. See also Szmukler, G. and Holloway,
F. (2000) Reform of the Mental Health Act: Reform or
safety? British Journal of Psychiatry, 177, 196–200.
89 Oral evidence taken before the Joint Committee on the
Draft Mental Incapacity Bill. Wednesday 8 October
2003. Response to Q298 (Dr Zigmond). The Bill is not
seen as comprehensive enough to fulfil that function.
For example, separate legislation would still be
required for mentally disordered offenders but the
suggestion of a Mental Disorder Offenders Bill would
be seen by many in the profession as discriminating and
highly stigmatising to many patients. In addition, many
of the safeguards of the MHA are absent from the
Mental Capacity Bill.
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Under the provisions of the Bill it would be possible for treatment for mental disorder to be given
under the authority of Clause 590 or within the scope of LPA91 and even in the face of resistance
from the person concerned.92 These provisions would give a statutory footing to the provision of
psychiatric treatment, which was both necessary and in their best interests, to Bournewood
patients93 who, by definition, would not be detained under the MHA. To the Joint Committee, the
Bournewood gap represented the lack of statutory safeguards94 for such patients. It highlighted the
current paucity of safeguards in the Bill and clarification as to what measures might be
incorporated to fill ‘the gap’ was called for.95
Clause 28 specifically excludes the mechanisms in the Bill from being applied to treatment for
mental disorder if that treatment is ‘regulated by Part IV of the Mental Health Act’.96 The
Government has clarified that when a person is subject to the relevant powers of the MHA then
the provisions of the Bill will be inapplicable.97 However, Clause 28 will still not apply to the
majority of psychiatric patients receiving treatment, including voluntary patients in hospital, those
detained under the MHA but not subject to Part IV MHA98 and those in the community and not
liable to be detained.99 Nonetheless, this would mean that an otherwise valid and applicable
advance decision would be overruled for detained patients for whom Part IV, MHA applies.
The position of advance decisions in the proposed reform of the Mental Health Act also requires
consideration. The White Paper ‘Reforming the Mental Health Act’100 made brief reference to what
it termed ‘advance agreements’101. It noted patients may draw on their past experiences of treatment
to state ‘what sort of treatment he or she would prefer if the mental disorder deteriorates’, adding that
such a record would be an important source to consult in determining ‘what care and treatment is
in a patient’s best interests’. Advance agreements, as their name suggests, should be drawn up in
consultation with the clinical team, who would ‘be expected to take account of any recent advance
agreement developed in consultation with specialist mental health services’102.
As set out in the White Paper advance agreements could state positive preferences for treatments.
This would incorporate the express principle of patient autonomy espoused by the Expert
Committee reviewing the Mental Health Act 1983.103 The Expert Committee also suggested that
‘advance directives be recognised as expressions of a patient’s capable wishes, and that they be allowed to
90 Op cit Note 1; Clause 5: Acts in connection with care
or treatment.
91 Op cit Note 1; Clause 11(6)(c).
92 Op cit Note 1; Clauses 11(1) to 11(5).
93 That is, compliant but incapacitated patients. From: R
v Bournewood Community and Mental Health NHS
Trust, ex parte L [1998] 3 All ER 289.
94 Ibid; at 308, per Lord Steyn. This was made in
reference to the MHA 1983.
95 Op cit Note 42; at para 225.
96 Op cit note 1; Clause 28(1).
97 Op cit Note 43; Response to Recommendation 67.
98 As defined in section 56, MHA and comprising those
patients detained under sections 4, 5(2), 5(4), 35, 135,
136 and conditionally discharged restricted patients.
99 In other words those receiving treatment as out-patients
on a voluntary basis and not subject to section 17
MHA.
100 Department of Health and Home Office (2000)
Reforming the Mental Health Act. Part I: The new
legal framework. Cm 5016-I. London: The Stationery
Office.
101 Ibid; paras 5.14–5.15.
102 A literal interpretation of this phrase would suggest the
advance agreement need only be considered but not
necessarily followed, even if the circumstances
envisaged in the document correspond to those
prevailing at the time; that ‘old’ agreements could be
disregarded as could those produced unilaterally by the
patient.
103 Op cit Note 48; at p22. The Committee themselves
recommended that ‘advance agreements about care’ be
introduced by statute and that they should ‘address the
patient’s treatment preference (if any) in relation to
any possible future care and treatment for mental
disorder’ (at p106).
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prevail in the same circumstances under the new act as those in which the wishes of the patient with
capacity at the time would be allowed to prevail’.104
By the time the draft Mental Health Bill105 was published advance statements had been relegated to
the Code of Practice106 but they are still framed as positive statements allowing patients to identify
‘what sort of treatment they would prefer if they become unwell’ (emphasis added). However, as befits
an advance statement as opposed to an advance directive, they need only ‘be taken into account’
during the formal assessment and should be recent as well as drafted ‘in consultation’ with the
mental health professionals.107 On the face of the draft Mental Health Bill negative phraseology is
used. Clause 121 refers to circumstances when informal treatment is not available because 
‘(a) the patient is not capable of consenting to the treatment, and
(b) he either –
(i) would resist the treatment if given, or
(ii) ..............
(4) .... it is to be assumed that a patient who has at any time indicated that he does not want to
receive treatment for mental disorder or particular treatment would resist such treatment.’
The Explanatory Notes to this draft Bill reinforces that the advance statement ‘whether in writing or
otherwise’ would be couched in terms of withholding consent.108 Moreover, the contents of an
advance statement could be overridden ‘in a case of urgency’ or if the proposed treatment was
included within the terms of a (mental health) order made under the provisions of Part II of the
Bill.109
In cases of informal treatment of patients not capable of consenting110 the role of the ‘nominated
person’111 becomes an important safeguard. ‘If it appears to the nominated person’ that the patient
would not have consented to the proposed treatment, had he been capable, then the nominated
person ‘must inform the clinical supervisor’ who ‘must then ensure’ that the proposed treatment is not
used ‘except in a case of urgency’.112 This could occur when the nominated person is aware of the
patient’s advance statement, which refers to the circumstances proposed. 
Conclusion
This paper, although it describes the proposed decision-making scheme for proxy directives
contained within the Mental Capacity Bill, is primarily concerned with instructional directives. 
The Bill is promoted as ‘enabling’ and ‘empowering’ but, by restricting the instructional directives
to recognition only of a refusal to consent to treatment, it places a significant impediment on the
expression of an individual’s ability to have his choice respected after he has lost the capacity to
make legally competent decisions. The Bill does permit positive preferences for treatment to be
expressed. However, these have to be mediated through the proxy of a lasting power of attorney
104 Op cit Note 48; at p106.
105 Department of Health (2002) Draft Mental Health
Bill. Cm 5538-I. London: The Stationery Office.
106 Department of Health (2002) Mental Health Bill.
Consultation Document. Cm 5538-II. London: The
Stationery Office. At p20.
107 Ibid.
108 Ibid; Explanatory Notes, at p45.
109 Op cit Note 105; clause 121(2).
110 Op cit Note 105; Part 5.
111 The successor person to the nearest relative from the
1983 Mental Health Act.
112 Op cit Note 105; clause 128(2).
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rather than via a directive giving advance consent to a specified treatment.113
In Re T Butler-Sloss, LJ. quoted, with approval, from the Canadian case of Malette v Shulman:
‘The right to determine what shall be done with one’s own body is a fundamental right in our society.
The concepts inherent in this right are the bedrock upon which the principles of self-determination and
individual autonomy are based. Free individual choice in matters affecting this right should, in my
opinion, be accorded very high priority’.114
In English law it is accepted that ‘an advance refusal made with capacity simply survives any supervening
incapacity’.115 Equally, in surgery advance consents survive the incapacity of general anaesthesia. 
A surgeon can discuss the possibility of needing a more extensive operation than the one
anticipated and the patient is asked to consent to that, as well as the planned operation, in advance
and without knowing whether the ‘second’ consent will be acted upon after he has lost
(temporarily) capacity. 
Advance decisions in favour of specified psychiatric treatments offer the prospect of more than
just a ready reference to a person’s legally competent choices after he has lost capacity. The process
of formulating an appropriate and relevant advance decision demands a dialogue between the
individual concerned and the mental health professionals. This can be beneficial in its own right
and can also have a more pervasive effect on the therapeutic relationship and the person’s
subsequent psychiatric career. However, ultimately, advance decisions, to consent and to refuse, are
about the limits we place on the person’s right to self-determination and for that autonomy to exist
beyond the time when capacity has been lost.
The Mental Capacity Bill has squandered the opportunity to go beyond statutory recognition of
the existing common law and create a law that could have been truly therapeutic in intent and
practice. Perhaps the debate over advance decisions is ultimately less to do with missing that
opportunity and is more concerned with opposing further moves towards capacity-based mental
health legislation.
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